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Abstract: Although Colman’s criticisms of orthodox game theory are con-
vincing, his assessment of progress toward construction of an alternative
is unnecessarily restrictive and pessimistic. He omits an important multi-
disciplinary literature grounded in human evolutionary biology, in partic-
ular the existence and function of social emotions experienced when fac-
ing some strategic choices. I end with an alternative suggestion for
modifying orthodox game theory.
Colman has brought together an impressive collection of argu-
ments to demonstrate both serious weaknesses and failures of or-
thodox game-theoretic rationality. But to address these problems
he offers only some “tentative and ad hoc suggestions” (sect. 8,
para. 2) from psychological game theory. Although I strongly en-
dorse his criticisms of orthodox game theory and agree that the
new reasoning principles he describes have a part to play, I think
his discussion of “where next” neglects some important ideas from
a recent and exciting multidisciplinary literature.
Because of the newness of this research and its multidiscipli-
nary origins, we must piece together some apparently disparate
strands of thought in order to glimpse the beginnings of an alter-
native to orthodox game-theoretic rationality. One reason why
Colman’s “destruction” work is much more comprehensive and
convincing than his subsequent “construction” is his early dis-
tinction between the nonrational “mindless” (sect. 1.3, para. 3)
strategic interaction of evolutionary game theory, and the rational
strategic interaction of human agents. He argues the former is not
of interest for his views on rationality, but I will argue that this di-
chotomy severely restricts the variety of new ideas that he can con-
sider.
To understand human decision-making in social interactions,
we should keep in mind that both humans and their decision-mak-
ing apparatus are themselves products of natural selection. There
is a growing consensus behind the “social animal” hypothesis (e.g.,
Barton & Dunbar 1997; Cartwright 2000), which maintains that
the selection pressures among humans were primarily an in-
traspecies phenomenon. In successive generations, reproductive
success went to those with the best grasp of the complexities of
the “social chess” that was a constant theme of tribal life. In this
view, underlying the anomalous cooperation observed in both ex-
perimental and real world social dilemmas is an innate predispo-
sition, not for unconditional cooperation, but for some form of
reciprocity. Indeed, there is a now a significant literature in ex-
perimental and theoretical economics on reciprocity models (see
Sethi & Somanathan 2003 for a recent survey).
Trivers (1985) argued that reciprocal altruism in humans
evolved by molding our emotional responses to the cost/benefit
calculus of social exchange; among these emotions are both coop-
erative and punitive sentiments. In a recent study, Price et al.
(2002) demonstrate that “punitive sentiments in collective action
contexts have evolved to reverse the fitness advantages that accrue
to free riders over producers.” Indeed, punitive sentiments must
go hand in hand with a preparedness to risk cooperation if coop-
eration is to survive the process of natural selection.
There is also a growing recognition that contrary to the standard
model of rational choice, “gut feelings experienced at the moment
of making a decision, which are often quite independent of the
consequences of the decision, can play a critical role in the choice
one eventually makes” (Loewenstein et al. 2001). For example,
they refer to the work of the neuroscientist Damasio (1994), who
shows how our ability to choose rationally is intertwined with our
ability to experience emotional reactions to the choices we face.
Damasio calls these reactions “somatic markers” and argues: “Na-
ture appears to have built the apparatus of rationality (the cere-
bral cortex) not just on top of the apparatus of biological regula-
tion (the limbic system), but also from it and with it” (p. 128). A
more human rationality may also allow for heterogeneity of
choices, in recognition of the differing intensities with which the
social (and other) emotions are experienced by different people in
the deliberation process.
Although neither Damasio nor Loewenstein and colleagues di-
rectly address the social emotions, we can easily extend their ar-
guments to the context of strategic interaction, where the emo-
tions that need incorporating for a descriptive theory are the
cooperative and punitive sentiments behind reciprocity. We might
even go further and argue for their incorporation into normative
models, as well. This is because our emotional responses to
choices that place our individual and collective interests in oppo-
sition embody adaptive knowledge that helped win many games
of “social chess.” These somatic responses may help us to extract
the long run benefits of cooperation.
There is also now direct evidence that a somatic response spe-
cific to human strategic interactions exists. Recent work by Rilling
et al. (2002), using fMRI scans on subjects playing prisoner’s
dilemma games, found that an individual’s brain activation pat-
terns when the playing partner was identified as a human differ
from when the partner was identified as a computer. They con-
clude “that (the relevant activation patterns) may relate specifi-
cally to cooperative social interactions with human partners.” It
seems that human players rely more on a common knowledge of
humanityin strategic interaction than a common knowledge of ra-
tionality as conventionally understood.
The finding of Rilling and colleagues also highlights the impor-
tance of the description or “framing” of the game for our choices.
Loewenstein and colleagues also noted, for choice under risk, that
these factors become important when we incorporate emotions
experienced when choosing, in contrast to the purely cognitive
evaluations of the standard model that are supposedly context in-
dependent. This implies we can no longer expect game theoretic
models to satisfy description invariance if a change in the de-
scription (e.g., that the other player is a person or a program) is
implemented.
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156 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2003) 26:2Colman discusses “Stackelberg reasoning” and “team thinking,”
and he mentions (sect. 8.1, para. 3) that the collective preferences
of team reasoning can be triggered by the acceptance of a group
identity in certain contexts. But he doesn’t explain where these al-
ternative reasoning methods come from, how they survive, or how,
if cooperation in social dilemmas is sensitive to the cost/benefit
ratio, we might “trade-off” the different reasoning methods in
some meta-reasoning process. Hamilton’s (1964) “kin-selection,”
Trivers’ (1971) “reciprocal altruism,” and Alexander’s (1987) “in-
direct reciprocity” models might at least offer a way to think about
answering these questions.
If we wish to incorporate the social emotions triggered by a
strategic choice into our models, how might we proceed? Hollis
and Sugden (1993) explained (p. 28) why our attitudes toward
consequences cannot be simply “bundled in” with the existing util-
ities of a game. A more plausible path then may be to alter the
weighting we attach to the consequences, along the lines of the
“rank dependent” transformation of the cumulative probability
distribution, which has worked so well among the alternatives to
expected utility theory (see Starmer 2000). In this way, some plau-
sible improvements to orthodox game theory might be developed,
as has already happened to expected utility theory in choice under
risk.
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